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NEW LIGHT ON CHINESE COMMUNISM FROM A DISILLUSIONED PARTY MEMBER

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SUMMARY

In August and September 1948 a Chinese who purported to be an officer in the Chinese Communist security police at Dairen and to be disillusioned with Communist rule in his country chose to relate his knowledge to an American vice consul at that Manchurian port. The intelligence supplied by the informant is considered generally credible, even though his acts have not always been consistent with his stated motives.

The informant contends that the USSR exercises considerable influence over the Chinese Communist Party and is constantly seeking to extend that influence. He asserts that this external pressure has been responsible for one of several cleavages that now exist within the Chinese Communist Party and that may, under new conditions, become more debilitating. Other divisions of Chinese Communist opinion reportedly have occurred over the issue of implementation of land reform and, among military men, over the political loyalty that should be extended to the party.

From his personal experience the informant testifies that the Chinese Communist security police, known as the "Protection of Society Department," has fallen under Soviet sway and that the port of Dairen is an important base for subversive activity in the Far East.

The informant's long stay in the Soviet-dominated Dairen-Port Arthur area (November 1945 to date of interviews) undoubtedly colored a number of his statements and lessens their application to conditions in the Communist regions of China proper.

NEW LIGHT ON CHINESE COMMUNISM FROM A DISILLUSIONED PARTY MEMBER

In August and September 1948 a Chinese who purported to be an officer in the Chinese Communist security police at Dairen and to be disillusioned with Communist rule chose to reveal his knowledge to an American vice consul at that Manchurian port.[1] Receipt of this intelligence has provided a unique opportunity for reassessment of available data on the organization, activities, and personalities of the Chinese Communist Party.[2]

The informant, who represented himself as Ch'en Ch'i-jen, a Chinese Communist lieutenant colonel and deputy chief of the International Intelligence Section of the Dairen security police, first approached the American vice consul in Dairen, Culver Gleysteen, on August 27, 1948. The informant described the visit as occasioned by his plan to leave the party, with which he had become disillusioned. The plan was to be effectuated during his forthcoming assignment to Korea, where, with the help he hoped to gain from the Dairen consulate, the informant desired to establish contact with the American intelligence authorities. With this explanation of his visit, the Communist agent inaugurated a series of talks with Gleysteen at the consulate that culminated in the vice consul's lengthy report.

1. D-10, Dairen, October 15, 1948, CONFIDENTIAL.
2. An evaluation of the informant's personal story and of the data he imparted is given in Section II, below. The voluminous material on party personalities is to be considered in a separate report by the Division of Biographic Information -- BI Information Note #64, CONFIDENTIAL, now in preparation.

Although Ch'en's acts have not always been consistent with his stated motives and there are discrepancies in his remarks, the information provided appears generally credible.

It should be noted that the conditions described by the informant are particularly those obtaining in Manchuria, and, more locally, in Kuantung. Moreover, Ch'en quarrels only with Communist tactics. He does not mention, and presumably does not question, either the theory of "colonial revolution" as expounded by Lenin, Stalin, and Mao Tse-tung or the exclusive right of the Chinese Communist Party to lead China's modernization.

I. SIGNIFICANT STATEMENTS OF THE INFORMANT

A. Subordination of the Chinese Communist Party to the USSR

The informant's conclusion is that the USSR enjoys paramount influence in the councils of Chinese Communism through two main media that act upon each other to buttress the Soviet viewpoint: the "Stalinist" group of leaders of the Chinese Communist Party; and certain conditions created by Soviet action.

Ch'en asserts that the "Stalinists," the men who are willing to follow Soviet guidance closely, are in the majority among the policy makers of the Chinese Communist Party. They are the "hard" men, led by Mao. In addition, the decisions of these men are influenced by local conditions that have been brought about by Soviet acts and whose continuance is acquiesced in by the "Stalinists." Among these Soviet-made conditions are the overt establishment of a preferential Soviet position in Manchuria, the close attention paid

to the work of the Chinese Communist security police, the tight control over the foreign news entering Communist China, the education given many members of the Chinese Party, and the substantial material and technical aid rendered the Communist forces in Manchuria.

Ch'en, with reason, makes no attempt to assess the degree to which these conditions have swayed the thinking of the "Stalinists." In any event, he declares, neither the offensive behavior of the Soviet troops, officials, and civilians in Kuantung nor the reported Soviet insistence on joining Inner Mongolia with the Mongolian People's Republic has lessened the ascendancy of the pro-Soviet viewpoint among the principal Chinese Communists.

As one concrete example of the imposition of Soviet views in the formulation of Chinese Communist Party policy, Ch'en relates that at the Seventh Party Congress in April 1945, which he attended, Mao stepped in to assure the acceptance of Soviet views when it became apparent that these views were in jeopardy. "The prevailing sentiment among Chinese Communists at that time," Ch'en says, "was to attack the Kuomintang before the war against Japan ended and to exert all effort to seize the whole of China by military means." On the other hand, "the Soviets wanted the Chinese Communist Party to make sham peace with the Kuomintang and to prepare to go underground [except in Manchuria]." Although Mao's interference secured party approval of Soviet policy, this tactic was later abandoned when

military involvement with Nationalist forces displayed the vulnerability of these forces and when the Kuomintang's demands during the peace negotiations failed to provide the Communists with a "requisite freedom of action."

B. Incipient Cleavages within the Chinese Communist Party

Ch'en states that the main division within the party is between those who condone revolutionary excesses in land reform and those who are horrified by them. Mao belongs to the group that condones these excesses. Hsiao Chun, Hsu Mao-yung, and Wang Ming (Ch'en Shao-yu) are among those who have been liquidated for their opposition.

More details are given concerning the division between those who favor accepting Soviet guidance and those who "would like to develop a thoroughly Chinese brand of Communism." Unfortunately, Ch'en is not consistent in his assignment of persons to these groups. At one point he assigns Mao, Li Li-san, Lin Piao, Nieh Jung-chen, Lin Peng, Ch'en Shao-yu (Wang Ming), Po I-po, and Hsi Chung-hsin to the first group and Chou En-lai, Liu Shao-ch'i, K'ang Sheng, Lo Jiu-ch'ing, and Li Fu-ch'un to the second. Yet, with reference to the Seventh Party Congress the informant lists Nieh Jung-chen as a leading supporter of the militant policy that the USSR is said to have opposed, and on the Inner Mongolian question Liu Shao-ch'i appears as an advocate of the "Soviet" policy of joining that area to the Mongolian People's Republic. The impression is also left that the "Stalinists" are those who condone the ruthless excesses in the conduct of the land reform program.

A third line of cleavage within the party divides those generals who are considered reliable party members and those who are more impressed by the military honors that a career in the Communist armies can offer them. In the first camp appear Lin Piao and Nieh Jung-chen; in the second, Liu Po-ch'eng and Hsu Shih-yu.

The informant, in conclusion, cautions that "most Chinese Communists ... are united in a desire to overthrow the Kuomintang and to achieve a Communist system in China" and that an open split is not imminent.

C. Soviet Guidance of the Organization and Activities of the Chinese Communist Security Police

The informant's major contribution of hitherto unencountered data relates to the Chinese Communist security police, known as the "Protection of Society Department" (社會保衛部). After a brief reference to the long history of the political police in Chinese Communism, Ch'en describes at some length the Soviet attention to this unit, without, however, dating the beginning of this attention. The Soviet purpose, he says, is "to prepare [the Society Department] for the future task of eliminating potential national or 'rotten bourgeois' deviationists." For the present, however, purges are being restrained.

The extent of Soviet penetration of this organization is not clearly realized by most party members, Ch'en contends, but, unfortunately, he does not elucidate on this point. He asserts that K'ang Sheng, director of the Chinese Communist security police and member of both the Central Committee and the Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party, cooperates closely with his Soviet counterparts, sometimes on matters of which even Mao is ignorant. The inference is that through K'ang the Soviet Union is molding all branches of the security police for its own purposes.

Soviet domination over the character and operations of the security police is, however, demonstrated satisfactorily only with respect to the Dairen unit. Here the Chinese and Soviety security police "work together almost as a single unit." Soviet agents have so guided the organization of the Dairen Society Department that it resembles the Soviet prototype. The head of the local Soviet MGB, or state security police, unit encourages promising members of the Chinese group to report directly to him. Russians give in-service training talks to their Chinese colleagues and have connections, undefined, with the basic training school for political police at Harbin. The Russians constantly seek to build up and maintain esprit de corps among the Chinese agents. When assigned overseas, Society Department men are presuaded to do special work for the MGB agency in the locality. "The result of this relationship," concludes Ch'en, "has been that the [Dairen] Society Department is almost solidly pro-Soviet."

The Dairen unit, according to the informant, has five main divisions: the Secretariat, the Education Office, the Intelligence Office, the Trial Office, and the Foreign Agents Office. The Secretariat is the administrative center; it receives reports, issues orders, maintains communications and files, keeps accounts, and has some authority to make arrests. The Education Office is responsible for in-service training for Department personnel; the security training of municipal police, government officials, and party members; and the indoctrination of the general public in various defenses against foreign espionage. The Intelligence Office has one section, with 693 full-time agents, to cover the activities of foreigners in Kuantung and another, with about 500 full-time agents, to check on the doings of the local populace; agents from both sections have authority to apprehend suspects. The Intelligence Office also has an archives section of eleven men. This section has operational functions as well as analytical ones, and Ch'en states that "it has more authority than the other intelligence sections and can assign its agents to special details." The Trial Office exerts great influence on the work of the local courts, but its principal task is to carry out political liquidations. A trial section extorts confessions, a prison section cares for the political suspects until they have made satisfactory confessions, and a sentence section dispatches them. The Foreign Agents Office is under the direct control of the chief of the entire Dairen unit and works closely with the international section of the Intelligence Office.

It is a liaison agency interposed between the headquarters of the Chinese Communist Party and party agents in transit or already abroad. Many Chinese agents operating out of this office are influential party members.

D. Dairen as a Center of International Subversive Activity

Ch'en contends that "the CCP has found Dairen to be a convenient transit point and base for its foreign agents. This is because Dairen has shipping to the outside world, commerce to serve as a front for agents, residual Korean and Japanese populations to provide connections to these countries, equipment available for outfitting agents, and active Soviet assistance." The fact that a two-star Chinese general is chief of the Dairen Society Department signifies, in the opinion of the informant, the importance of the Chinese security police unit there.

Ch'en declares that the majority of the Chinese Communists sent abroad as agents work directly under the Society Department. There is also a "Contact Department," directed by Lin Feng, which solicits support from overseas Chinese communities.

E. Power of the Military Council of the Central Committee

The power of the Military Council of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party is, according to Ch'en, "second only to that of the Politburo." He gives the names of seventeen members. Three have primarily political responsibilities; nine are engaged primarily in military matters; two represent the security police; and three are Russians. Six men tend to make the

political and military decisions in the name of this body: Mao, Jen Pi-shih, Chu Teh, Yeh Chien-ying, K'ang Sheng, and Li Fu-ch'un. Of these six, only two have purely military backgrounds.

II. CRITIQUE

The general purpose of this critique is to determine the credibility of the informant and the authenticity of his information. An attempt will also be made to assess the significance of the informant's remarks.

A. The Credibility of the Informant

Ch'en's acts do not always follow rationally from his stated motives. It is possible to argue that this fact, in conjunction with his occasional contradictory remarks and his haziness on certain details, indicates that Ch'en is sincere and is manifesting normal human inconsistencies. On the other hand, the possibility exists that his visits had the approval of his superiors.

Ch'en gives three political reasons and one personal reason for his dissatisfaction with the Communist program for China. The political reasons are the destructive civil war, the subservience of the Chinese Communists to the Soviet Union, and Communist land reform policies. The personal reason is the murder of his landlord parents and two infant sons by Communist soldiers. Ch'en notified the party of his personal grievance by letter in the spring of 1948, simultaneously avowing his continued loyalty. No indication is given of the reply he received, if any, from the party. The idea of "escaping from Communism" with the aid of the American consulate at Dairen then took shape, he says, but it was not carried out until

some time after the arrival of Chinese-speaking vice consul Gleysteen in June 1948.

That, despite his precautions, Ch'en should have continued free from the suspicions of his superiors is highly doubtful. His known personal grievance must certainly made them suspicious of the frequent visits to the consulate that were required to produce 75 pages of information. It is doubtful whether the biographic data on consulate members supplied to Ch'en or the manufactured role of purchasing agent and money changer could have served as plausible pretexts for long. Collusion on the part of some other members of the Chinese security police therefore seems a definite possibility.

The informant's imprudence in approaching the American consulate in Dairen would also seem to cast doubt on the credibility of his purported disaffection. Knowing that he was soon to be on an assignment in South Korea, he might reasonably have bided his time until he could unfold his information in territory guaranteeing him greater personal security. In the Communist-controlled countries of Eastern Europe, however, there have been precedents for his behavior. The fear of betrayal by American officials in "safe" territory is apparently at the root of the matter and stems itself from the environment of intense suspicion in which would-be informants ~~would~~ must live.

The informant's delay in approaching the American consulate has an explanation consistent with his story: natural indecision over such an important personal matter; distrust of interpreters;

and a desire to sound out Gleysteen's personality. On the other hand, his delay may be a fiction; Ch'en may have started talking with the vice consul after his superiors had approved his visit for purposes of their own.

The account Ch'en gives of his personal history is internally consistent and conforms with the history of the times.

B. The Authenticity of the Informant's Information

The conclusion from close scrutiny is that the intelligence provided by Ch'en is as authentic as one could expect from a person with his perspective. There are statements requiring qualification, contradictory statements, and statements quite at variance with other available information, but, on the whole, Ch'en's remarks seem deserving of credence.

1. Subordination of the Chinese Communist Party to the USSR. Although the informant's opinions were very likely colored by his recent duty in areas known to be under strong Soviet influence, his thesis that the USSR is constantly seeking to extend its penetration of the Chinese Communist Party seems essentially correct. However, his claim that the Chinese Communist Party, in turn, has become increasingly pro-Soviet cannot be accepted as readily. That the Soviet Union is not completely satisfied with the professed loyalty of the Chinese Communist Party is suggested by the restrained Soviet comments on the victories of the People's Liberation Army; the

surprising move to Canton of the Soviet Ambassador; the reported negotiations between Soviet Ambassador Roschin and Chiang K'ai-shek; and the reported desire of the Russians that the People's Liberation Army remain north of the Yangtze.

Nevertheless, there is evidence external to that in the report indicating that the men in control of the Chinese Communist Party are confirmed advocates of the USSR's leadership of the world revolution in which the New China will take an active role. Mao and Liu Shao-ch'i proclaimed this theme in November 1948. The informant chose the world "Stalinist" to characterize Mao; by this term he apparently meant "pro-Soviet." On the whole, the label fits. Mao has independently carried into effect the program outlined by Lenin and Stalin for "colonial revolution." In his leadership of the Chinese Communist Party since the end of the Pacific war, he has shown no strenuous public opposition to Soviet aims; witness his acquiescence in the possessive attitude of the USSR toward Manchuria and Sinkiang.

The situations created by the USSR to predispose the leaders of the Chinese Communist Party toward acceptance of Soviet guidance are likewise fairly well substantiated from independent sources. The paramountcy of Soviet interests in the Kuantung area has been witnessed at first hand. The tight control exercised by TASS over foreign news entering the Communist press is a familiar fact.

The indebtedness of many Chinese Communists to the USSR for their training has been freely acknowledged. It has not been as easy to show the extent of Soviet aid to the Communist armies, but the acquisition by the Communists of Japanese arms that were surrendered to the Russians appears unquestioned. The purported Soviet attempt to wean Inner Mongolia away from the influence of the Chinese Communist Party finds support, too, even if less definite. Another probable agency of Soviet direction of Chinese Communism, unmentioned by the informant, is the virtual monopoly that the Soviet Union possesses over the diplomatic and military intelligence reaching the Chinese Politburo from areas outside the Far East, especially that intelligence concerning the aims and capabilities of the US.

A variety of information attests to the veracity of the informant's claim of Soviet interference at the Seventh Party Congress in April 1945. Chinese Communist troops must have had Soviet sanction when they began to move into Manchuria before the end of the war. Mao's agreement with Chiang K'ai-shek on South China, the withdrawal of the New Fourth Army to the Lung-hai area, and Communist willingness to negotiate on coalition government also tend to support Ch'en's statement. There are indications that Mao now has less tactical freedom in his application of the principles of "colonial revolution" than he had before 1945. The Russians appear to be enlarging their conception of what tactical issues in

China affect them. Nevertheless, the Chinese Communist Party undoubtedly still enjoys much latitude on domestic matters.

Another example of Soviet guidance of the Chinese Communist Party cited by the informant needs qualification. This is the statement that "it became possible to air anti-American feeling publicly only after Vishinsky's 1947 speech before the United Nations General Assembly." Anti-American propaganda was reaching the Chinese public many months before Vishinsky addressed the General Assembly. However, it became vitrielic and began attacking US policy outside China only after that speech.

Ch'en's remarks with respect to the Inner Mongolian question[1] require slight amplification. While a difference of opinion very likely exists among the Chinese Communists as to the orientation of Inner Mongolia, it seems misleading to say, as does the report, that Mao and other leading party members "are in favor of joining Inner Mongolia to the Mongolian People's Republic." It is doubtful that they would favor such a policy in principle; rather, Mao can afford to take such a stand as a tactical measure because of the peripheral relationship of this region to Chinese Communist problems.

2. Incipient Cleavages within the Chinese Communist Party. To date there has been little knowledge about a split within the Chinese Communist Party over the issue of the attitude to be taken

1. D-10, Dairen, October 15, 1948, CONFIDENTIAL, p. 15.

toward Soviet guidance; there has been only the suspicion that it must exist. Ch'en removes the doubt concerning the existence of this intra-party division, but the details he provides sometimes contradict each other and seem to reflect personal speculations. He depicts the cleavage as having Mao and Chou En-lai as its poles; that is at variance with the popular conception, according to which Mao and Li Li-san are the opposing protagonists. The difficulty is that the Soviet position, if any, on the matters over which Mao and Chou are known, or strongly suspected, to be divided is not revealed. Late in the summer of 1948 Chou's contacts with General Chang Chih-chung looking toward a negotiated settlement of the civil war were disavowed. The Soviet view of the situation remains unknown.

Ch'en's statements concerning the allegiances of the leading party members appear at times to be counter both to other remarks of his and to some of their later actions. It seems incongruous that K'ang Sheng, who is pictured as cooperating closely with the Soviet security police agents, should also be opposed to Soviet domination of the party. With regard to the question of the resumption of military operations south of the Yangtze, on which the Russians are suspected of having represented

their position to the Chinese Communist Party, it is reported that Mao is ranged against the separate opinions of Lin Piao and Li Li-san; Chou may even be on Mao's side.

In his discussion of the administration of land reform Ch'en seems to have interjected many of his personal prejudices, and understandably so, if his story is to be believed. The conviction of the informant that Mao condones the excesses of land reform does not square with Mao's several chastisements of those who commit revolutionary indiscretions. Moreover, the informant mentions no disagreement concerning the social groups toward which reform is to be directed. Mao's frequent admonitions to over-zealous party workers to cease destroying the economic resources of the middle peasants, and even of the rich peasants and landlords who operated industrial undertakings, indicate that the issue of the scope of land reform must have been warmly contested, too.

Ch'en's judgments concerning which generals are politically reliable and which are unreliable appear plausible but are hard to evaluate. Again, reservations should be attached to his assignment of particular generals to one camp or the other. For example, a recent despatch lists Generals Lin Piao and Liu Po-ch'eng as being united in their support of continued military activity south of the Yangtze, to which Mao is reportedly opposed. One should also be skeptical of the informant 's claim that 75 percent of the

members of the People's Liberation Army are politically unreliable.[1] While it is conceivable that three-quarters of the Communist armies have untrustworthy revolutionary backgrounds, it is also conceivable that many of these troops have succeeded in living down their backgrounds. This metamorphosis, of course, would not minimize the problems that will attend upon any eventual demobilization of the Liberation Army.

3. Soviet Guidance of the Organization and Activities of the Chinese Communist Security Police. The usefulness of the informant's description of the organization and activities of the "Protection of Society Department" is limited by its particular application to the situation in the Kuantung peninsula. For this geographical context, however, the description appears plausible. Ch'en's conclusions concerning the predominance of Soviet influence and the closeness of Sino-Soviet cooperation are not extraordinary in view of the paramount position of the Russians at Dairen and in its environs. In areas south of Manchuria, where Soviet interests are less strong, Chinese interests more exclusive, and Soviet advisers therefore more conspicuous, the character and operations of the security police may be different from those described by Ch'en. On the other hand, should the training of Society Department members become virtually a Soviet preserve, his conclusions may deserve wider application.

1. D-10, Dairen, October 15, 1948, CONFIDENTIAL, p. 40

It is unfortunate that the report is silent on the work of the Society Department elsewhere in China. Ch'en states that the Society Department is almost coeval with the party.[1] This would suggest that there was a long period (1927-45) during which the policy and program of the Society Department were molded largely by Chinese Communists. If, as Ch'en claims, he was associated with this party organ since before 1945 within China proper, it is natural that Ch'en would be aware of Soviet penetration into the organization and activities of the Department after 1945. Unfortunately, he did not choose to compare the Society Department as it operated in Kuantung with the Department as it operated in China proper.

After Ch'en's statement that the Department "has existed for almost as long as the party has,"[2] Vice Consul Gleysteen makes the remark based presumably on what Ch'en told him, that "almost all other Chinese Communists" are "unaware of the role that the MVD [Ed. MGB, the Soviety security police] plays in Russian socialism" and "see no particular significance in the close Soviet attention to their Society Department."[3] Contradictory as these statements would appear, there probably is some truth in them. Many persons joined the Communist ranks out of unbounded contempt for the Kuomintang government and have been more concerned with the reconstruction of Chinese

1. Ibid., p. 10.
2. Ibid., p. 10.
3. Ibid., p. 11.

life than with a comparative study of Communism as practiced in the USSR and China. In addition, the political needs of the Chinese Communist Party since its inception have placed a premium on cooperation with potentially hostile or divergent political groups. By contrast, the Russian Communists have long enjoyed political supremacy at home and have been uninhibited in the assertion of their power in periods of crisis. This difference in domestic political conditions has led to a greater utilization of the security police in the USSR and, conceivably, to a relative ignorance among many Chinese Communists as to the potentialities of their Society Department.

The informant's constant comparison of the Society Department with the Soviet MVD, although the Chinese organization he describes corresponds more closely to the Soviet MGB, appears incongruous, especially when he is supposed to have received some Soviet indoctrination. This conclusion rests on the assumption that vice consul Gleysteen was aware, when he wrote his report, of the distinction that has existed in the Soviet Union since 1943 between the MVD, or regular police, and the MGB, or state security police.

4. Dairen as a Center of International Subversive Activity. The informant's claims for Dairen do not diminish the importance of Hong Kong as a focus for similar activity. Hongkong possesses all Dairen's advantages except the Japanese and Korean communities and "Soviet assistance." Recent reports still describe the British colony as the base for many Chinese Communist agents working

throughout Southeast Asia.

The statement that the Russians consider the Chinese Communists "better equipped mentally than [themselves] for agitation work in the Far East" and that, therefore, they "encourage the Chinese Communists to do foreign missionary work"[1] is difficult to evaluate. That the Russians, however, should consider any other people more gifted than themselves for Communist agitation work appears highly improbable. While the extent of Soviet encouragement to Chinese Communist "missionary work" is hard to discern, the Communist movement in the Far East, as elsewhere, has developed largely indigenously. On the other hand, the Communist Party of China does exercise considerable influence among the Chinese communities of Siam, Malaya, Indonesia, and Indochina, where party units have been established independent of the Communist parties of the native populations.

The informant overestimates Chinese Communist influence in Korea when he says that "most of the Communist organization work in North Korea was carried out by Chinese."[2] There are no known Chinese in the upper hierarchy of Korean Communism. In all probability, however, Ch'en was considering Manchurian Koreans as "Chinese" in a political sense. Manchurian Koreans who were trained in the Communist regions of China play a significant role in North Korea, although they are probably overshadowed by Korean Communists educated in the USSR.

5. Power of the Military Council of the Central Committee. The existence of a Military Council and the place of Mao and Chu Teh in it

1. Ibid., p. 25.
2. Ibid., p. 26.

have been known for some time. The supremacy of similarly constituted bodies in the US as well as the USSR in wartime and the similar position of political leaders within them corroborates the commanding position of the Military Council and of the Chinese Communist statesmen over the generals. The poor state of communications in China explains the concentration of authority in few hands. There is almost no information on the basis of which to confirm or deny Ch'en's statement that there are Russians on the Council or his statements concerning the other members.

6. Miscellaneous Comments. The informant's claim as to the size of the Chinese Communist police force in the Kuantung area[1] cannot be definitely evaluated. However, Chinese Communist order-of-battle information as of June 1, 1948 does not list any units stationed within the old leased territory and mentions only a garrison force of 4,800 men based at nearby Fu-hsien and the 5th Column of the Northeastern People's Liberation Army, a field operations unit of 15,000 men, disposed in southern Liaoning.

The number of Soviet troops in Kuantung[2] is roughly substantiated by other information, as is the reported existence of a Chinese Communist Army officers' school at Lao-hu-t'an.

Although some of the schools mentioned in the report[3] have not been known to exist, it is probably that they do; none seems

1. Ibid., p. 18
2. Ibid., p. 58
3. Ibid., p. 38

superfluous as described. Other reports have referred to Chinese Communist military schools near Harbin. The Kuomintang, too, felt the necessity of a school for prospective hsien (county) magistrates.

The three industrial combines mentioned by Ch'en[1] were also reported by Japanese repatriates in July 1948 as being under Chinese Communist management.

[1] Ibid., p. 57